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I INTRODUCTION
One fine day in the middle of the night,
Two dead men got up to fight,
Back to back they faced each other,
Drew their swords and shot each other.
— Shoolyard rhyme, 19th Century1
This nonsense verse is a series of impossibilities. The possibility of the event
or situation described in the second part of each line is negated by the
conditions described in the ﬁrst part. The combination of mutually
destructive conditions makes each development in the vignette ridiculous.
However appropriate impossibilities are in nonsense verse, they are wholly
inappropriate in law. Where the law does contemplate an impossible
situation something is wrong, and legal reasoning that leads to an impossible
situation must be faulty.
A difference of opinion has emerged in the courts recently as to whether
public-sector employment decisions are subject to the controls of adminis-
trative law or not. However, the reasoning relied on by the judges that have
held that administrative law does not apply to public-sector employment
leads to an impossible situation. The necessary rejection of this reasoning has
important consequences for administrative justice and the role that it has to
play in the legal control of public- sector employment relationships.
Administrative law is intended to control the exercise of public power.
The right to administrative justice in s 33 of the Constitution ensures that
exercises of public power remain in accordance with principles of procedural
fairness, lawfulness and reasonableness.2 The Promotion of Administrative
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1 Peter & IonaOpie The Lore and Language of Schoolchildren (1959) 24–6.
2 Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of SouthAfrica, 1996 reads: ‘(1)
Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and proce-
durally fair. (2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative
action has the right to be given written reasons. (3) National legislation must be
enacted to give effect to these rights, and must — (a) provide for the review of
administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial
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Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) has been enacted to give meaning to this right,
and is now the gateway to the constitutional right to administrative justice.3
Actions or decisions that ﬁt the deﬁnition of ‘administrative action’ in s 1 of
PAJA must adhere to the principles of administrative justice, and are
reviewable by the courts where they fail to do so.
The courts have been required on a number of occasions over the last few
years to decide if the actions of the state as an employer are subject to the
controls of administrative law and must be consistent with the principles of
administrative justice.4 A number of contrasting and conﬂicting approaches
have emerged in the High Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) and
the Constitutional Court, and it is the implications of these judgments that
form the subject of this article. Plasket J held in Police and Prisons Civil Rights
Union and others v Minister of Correctional Services and others5 (POPCRU) that
the Minister’s decision to dismiss persons employed by the Department of
Correctional Services as correctional ofﬁcers amounted to administrative
action and proceeded to review the decision, while Murphy AJ held in SA
Police Union v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service6 (SAPU) that the
Commissioner’s decision unilaterally to change the arrangement of working
hours of members of the South African Police Service did not amount to
administrative action.7 The SCA held by a plurality in Transnet Ltd & others v
Chirwa8 (Chirwa SCA) that the employment decisions of organs of state are
tribunal; (b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and
(2); and (c) promote an efﬁcient administration.’
3 The Constitutional Court has held that a litigant cannot seek to rely on the
protections of the right to administrative justice in s 33 of the Constitution without
relying on PAJA. It is not possible to go behind PAJA and rely directly on s 33. Any
attempt to access the right to administrative justice must therefore begin with reliance
on the provisions of PAJA. See Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd
2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 96 (per Chaskalson CJ), para 436 (per Ngcobo J) and para
586 (per Sachs J). Aminority of judges in New Clicks held that it was not necessary to
decide if PAJAwas applicable (see para 671 perMoseneke J).
4 Although there is not a great deal of academic commentary in this area as yet, see
generally Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 194–9, Carl Mis-
chke ‘Administrative action and employment law: Do employees in the public sector
enjoy additional remedies?’ (2006) 15 Contemporary Labour Law 86, Stefan van Eck &
Ronell Jordaan-Parkin ‘Administrative, labour and constitutional law — A jurisdic-
tional labyrinth’ (2006) 27 ILJ 1987, Dhaya Pillay, ‘PAJA v labour law’ (2005) 20
SAPL 413 (considering a broader range of issues), and P A K le Roux ‘Individual
labour law’2006 Current Labour Law 1 at 12–17.
5 [2006] 2All SA175 (E).
6 (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC).
7 There are a number of decisions of the High Courts that support each of these
views. Plasket J’s conclusions are mirrored in the cases of Mbayeka v MEC for Welfare,
Eastern Cape [2001] 1 All SA 567 (Tk), Simela v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape
[2001] 9 BLLR 1085 (LC) and Dunn v Minister of Defence [2005] JOL15881 (T), while
Murphy AJ’s view is supported by Public Servants’ Association obo Haschke v MEC for
Agriculture [2004] 8 BLLR 822 (LC) and followed in Hlope v Minister of Safety and
Security [2006] 3 BLLR 297 (LC).
8 2007 (2) SA198 (SCA).
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not subject to the controls of administrative law. Mthiyane JA (Jafta JA
concurring) agreed with Murphy AJ that public-sector employment deci-
sions are simply not ‘administrative action’ as deﬁned in PAJA because they
lack a public nature and evade classiﬁcation as exercises of public power or
performances of public functions. Conradie JA was ‘prepared to accept’ that
this class of decisions amounts to ‘administrative action’,9 but nevertheless
held that the application of labour law to public-sector employment
decisions covered the ﬁeld and left no room for the application of
administrative law principles. Cameron JA (with Mpati DP concurring)
agreed with Conradie JA that public-sector employment decisions are
administrative action, but found no reason to withhold the protections of
administrative law from the subjects of those decisions.
In the Constitutional Court judgment in the same matter10 the majority,
per Skweyiya J, noted its agreement with Conradie JA’s approach even
though it decided the matter on the basis of jurisdiction.11 Ngcobo J ﬁled a
separate judgment, concurred in by the same majority, in which he
emphasized that the application of the labour-law regime to public-sector
employees obviates the need for the application of administrative law to
public-sector employment decisions.12 Langa CJ’s minority judgment,
concurred in by O’Regan and Mokgoro JJ, followed Cameron JA’s approach
in deciding whether the decision constituted an administrative action, but
reached a different conclusion to that of Cameron JA.13
Even though the implication of the majority decision in the Constitu-
tional Court is that organs of state need not comply with principles of
administrative justice when taking employment decisions, there is no
consensus on the principles underlying this position. Both the Constitutional
Court and the SCA were divided on the proper approach to be taken to
deciding if an employment decision constitutes administrative action. Langa
CJ and Cameron JA disagreed with the approach taken by their colleagues,
although Langa CJ ultimately agreed with the order made by the majority.
Consequently, two questions of principle remain without an authoritative
answer. First, what approach should be taken to the question whether
public-sector employment decisions are administrative action? Secondly,
does the applicability of labour law and the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
(the LRA) preclude the application of PAJA and the protections of
administrative law?14 I explain in parts II and III of this article that the answer
to these questions is implicit in decisions already made by the Constitutional
9 Ibid para 26.
10 Chirwa v Transnet Ltd [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) (Chirwa (CC)).
11 Ibid paras 36–44 and 73.
12 Ibid para 148.
13 Ibid paras 186–94.
14 These questions are succinctly put by Cameron JA early in his judgment where
he states (para 49): ‘The problem the employee’s claim presents may be considered in
two stages. If there were no LRA, would the employee be able to bring her claim
under PAJA? Though my colleague Mthiyane says No, I conclude that she can.
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Court, and that the majority of the court in the Chirwa matter, in taking the
approach that it did, has ignored its own jurisprudence. The principles that
can be extracted from AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory
Council15 suggest, in the ﬁrst place, that public-sector employment decisions
can under certain circumstances be considered ‘administrative action’ for the
purposes of PAJA, while the reasoning of the majority of the court in
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape16 suggests, in the second
place, that, since private-law remedies may not be sought for public-law
wrongs, public-law remedies must be available for public-law wrongs. If
public-sector employment decisions amount to exercises of public power,
and if they can therefore be ‘public-law wrongs’, then they should, on the
strength of Steenkamp, be exposed to the remedial measures of public law.
And I argue on the strength of AAA Investments that public-sector
employment decisions can be deﬁned as ‘administrative actions’ and must be
considered ‘public-law wrongs’ whenever they are unlawful, unreasonable
or procedurally unfair.
The separate concurring judgment of Sachs J in the Steenkamp case
provides the fulcrum for my argument. Sachs J holds that the Constitution
does not contemplate the duplication of remedies, and that it is constitution-
ally impermissible for remedies rooted in separate ﬁelds of law to function
side by side.17 Sachs J’s judgment thus encapsulates the reasoning underpin-
ning the approach that Ngcobo J, Skweyiya J, Conradie JA and Murphy AJ
have taken, and sums up a position in direct opposition to the conclusions I
reach. Justice Sachs, as a proponent of this opposing position, will be my
interlocutor in part IV of this article. I defend my thesis by showing, through
an imagined conversation with Justice Sachs, that the outcomes of the
position he represents are inconsistent with the constitutional reasoning at
the heart of the AAA Investments and Steenkamp decisions.18 My argument for
rejecting the opposing approach takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum,
showing that the conclusions the approach leads to are absurd, impossible
and constitutionally unsupportable. I suggest that the Chirwa case should
have been decided by a particular process of constitutional reasoning. The
majority in the Constitutional Court adopted an approach inconsistent with
this process and, in so doing, failed to pay due regard to jurisprudential
principles the court has itself outlined. The result of this failure is, in cases of
public-sector employment decisions, logically impossible.
Second, does the LRA obstruct that conclusion? Though my colleague Conradie JA
saysYes, I conclude that it does not.’
15 2006 (11) BCLR 1255 (CC).
16 2007 (3) SA121 (CC).
17 Ibid para 99.
18 When I refer to the comments made in a judicial setting, I will refer to ‘Sachs J’,
but when I engage in imagined conversation it will be with ‘Justice Sachs’.
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II AAA INVESTMENTS — DEFINING ‘PUBLIC POWER’
1. The definition of ‘administrative action’ in PAJA
Skweyiya J avoided engaging with the deﬁnition of administrative action in
the Chirwa case by deciding that the High Court did not have jurisdiction in
terms of the LRA to adjudicate any cause of action pursued by Ms Chirwa in
the High Court — including one based on administrative law. Section
157(1) of the LRA provides that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction
over all matters that are in terms of the LRA or any other legislation ‘to be
determined by the Labour Court’. In terms of s 157(2) of the LRA, the High
Courts and the Labour Court enjoy ‘concurrent jurisdiction’ in respect of
any threatened or alleged violation of rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights
and arising from employment or labour relations or any executive act of the
state in its capacity as an employer.19 In characterizing Ms Chirwa’s claim as
one based on a failure to comply with requirements set out in the LRA,
Skweyiya J found that the matter was to be decided by the Labour Court and
concluded that whether the decision to dismiss Ms Chirwa was administra-
tive action was of no consequence.20 In his separate judgment Ngcobo J
emphasized the importance of addressing whether Ms Chirwa’s dismissal
amounted to an administrative action, but nevertheless prefaced these
considerations with jurisdictional ones.21 Langa CJ, on the other hand,
pointed out that jurisdiction is a secondary inquiry. The primary question is
whether PAJA affords Ms Chirwa a cause of action other than those provided
in the LRA.22 To answer the jurisdictional question — or to decide if an
applicant’s case is a matter to be decided by the Labour Court — ﬁrst, would
‘have the absurd practical result that whether or not the High Court has
jurisdiction will depend on the answer to a question that the Court could
only consider if it had jurisdiction in the ﬁrst place’.23 As Langa CJ observes:
19 The relevant text of the LRAreads in full:
‘ (1) Subject to the Constitution and section 173, and except where this Act
provides otherwise, the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of
all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in terms of any other law are
to be determined by the Labour Court.
(2) The Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court in
respect of any alleged or threatened violation of any fundamental right
entrenched in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of SouthAfrica,
1996, and arising from —
(a) employment and from labour relations;
(b) any dispute over the constitutionality of any executive or administrative
act or conduct, or any threatened executive or administrative act or
conduct, by the State in its capacity as an employer; and
(c) the application of any law for the administration of which the Minister is
responsible.’
20 Chirwa (CC) supra note 10 para 73.
21 Ibid para 80.
22 Ibid paras 154 and 157–9.
23 Ibid para 169.
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‘The claim concerns whether an action is an ‘‘administrative act . . . by the State
in its capacity as employer’’, and if so, whether that act should be set aside. This
is exactly what section 157(2)(b) of the LRA places in the concurrent
jurisdiction of both the High Court and the Labour Court.’24
Following Langa CJ’s approach, an investigation of whether the employ-
ment decisions of the state constitute administrative action must begin where
just about all the judgments dealing with the issue do — namely, with the
deﬁnition of administrative action in s 1 of PAJA. The deﬁnition has a
positive element that sets out the necessary elements of ‘administrative
action’, as well as a negative element that excludes a number of decisions.
The disagreement as to whether public-sector employment decisions are
‘administrative action’ turns on the positive elements of the deﬁnition, and
the exclusions need not be dealt with here. Section 1 of PAJA states that
‘administrative action’ is
‘any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by —
(a) an organ of state, when —
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial
constitution; or
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of
any legislation;
. . .
which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct external
legal effect’.25
It is not difﬁcult to determine in each case whether an employer is an
organ of state. The deﬁnition assigned to the term in s 1 of PAJA is the same
as that given to the term in s 239 of the Constitution, and includes any
department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local
sphere of government as well as any other functionary exercising a public
power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation. The
troublesome parts of the deﬁnition in this context are whether the power or
function is exercised or performed in terms of legislation and whether the
power or function is ‘public’.
2. A decision of a purely private nature
In the SAPU case MurphyAJ acknowledged that the powers of the National
Commissioner in regard to labour matters are rooted in the terms of the
South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 (the SAPSAct).26 Section 24(1)
of thatAct empowers the Minister of Safety and Security to make regulations
relating to the conditions of service of members of the South African Police
24 Ibid para 168.
25 Part (b) of the deﬁnition above deals with the decisions of ‘a natural or juristic
person other than an organ of state’. The decisions under consideration in this article
were all taken by organs of state, and the parts of the deﬁnition that concern persons
or institutions other than organs of state can be ignored.
26 Supra note 6 paras 51–2.
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Service. In making regulations the Minister conferred on the National
Commissioner of the South African Police Service the authority to
determine working hours, among other things, which prerogative may be
exercised unilaterally or bilaterally, in terms of existing contracts of
employment or collective agreements. The National Commissioner’s
decision to change working hours was taken in terms of this legislative
framework; and although Murphy AJ held that the decision-making power
was therefore derived from a public source,27 he held that the change in the
working hours was effected in terms of a collective agreement concluded
between the SA Police Union and the National Commissioner.28 This
agreement, as ‘a contract concluded on equal terms between equal parties
‘‘without any element of superiority or authority’’ deriving from the SAPS’s
public position’,29 MurphyAJ continued, located the National Commission-
er’s decision squarely in the private realm.
It looks at ﬁrst as if Murphy AJ is confused as to the source of the power,
and that it is at once both public and private — but the explanation of this
confusion lies in seeing the source of the decision-making power as the
legislation, and thus public, and the decision itself as bounded by the terms of
the private collective agreement. The source of a power, however, is not
dispositive of the question of whether that power is public.30 The
Constitutional Court indicated in SARFU that while the source of power is
relevant to determining whether it is a public power, other factors to be
considered include the nature of the power, its subject matter and whether it
involves the exercise of a public duty.31 MurphyAJ recognized and relied on
this principle to look beyond the underlying legislative source of the
National Commissioner’s power to determine working conditions.32
Indeed, in cases like SAPU, where the decision straddles the public and
private domains, the source of the power becomes incidental.33 The crisp
question, and the question squarely before Murphy AJ, was whether the
power exercised in the case was public. Murphy AJ was unequivocal in
describing it as free from any public characteristics:
27 Ibid para 51.
28 Ibid para 53.
29 Ibid. The quote is taken from Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 (2) SA
460 (SCA) para 10.
30 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Union 2000 (1) SA 1
(CC) (SARFU) para 143.
31 Ibid.
32 SAPU supra note 6 para 51.
33 In the case of bodies other than organs of state the inquiry as to the source of the
power is virtually meaningless. In terms of the deﬁnition in PAJA, a decision or failure
to take a decision by a natural or juristic person other than an organ of state is an
administrative action if, among other things, it is taken in terms of an ‘empowering
provision’.An ‘empowering provision’ is in turn deﬁned extremely widely to include
‘a law, a rule of common law, customary law, or an agreement, instrument or other
document’.
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‘There is nothing inherently public about the setting of working hours of
police ofﬁcers. Nor is there any public law concern here, the matter falls far
more readily within the domain of contractual regulation of private employ-
ment relations. The nature of the power exercised and the function performed
in the setting or agreeing of shift times does not relate to the government’s
conduct in its relationship with its citizenry to which it is accountable in
accordance with the precepts of representative democracy and governance.
The powers and functions concerned derive from employment law and are
circumscribed by the constitutional rights to fair labour practices and to engage
in collective bargaining. One is instinctively drawn to the conclusion that the
concept of administrative law action is not intended to embrace acts properly
regulated by private law.’34
Ambiguity surrounding the source of the power aside, the important
conclusion was that on a conspectus of factors the power was entirely private
in nature and properly the subject of private contractual rather than public
administrative control.
The source of the power played a central role in Mthiyane JA’s judgment
in the Chirwa matter, however. Mthiyane JA concedes early on that Transnet
is an ‘organ of state’,35 which s 239 of the Constitution deﬁnes as any
‘functionary or institution exercising a public power or performing a public
function in terms of any legislation’. He held that although Transnet is an
organ of state and derives its authority to enter into contracts from statute,36
its power to terminate contracts does not derive from the same source.37 In
this regard, at least, Mthiyane JA is correct. The Legal Succession to the
South African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989, the statute that establishes
Transnet and sets out its powers, does not confer on Transnet the power to
dismiss employees. The power to terminate contracts must be found entirely
in the terms of the contracts themselves.38 Mthiyane JA concluded that
‘the nature of the conduct involved here is the termination of a contract of
employment. It is based on contract and does not involve the exercise of any
public power or performance of a public function in terms of legislation.’39
34 SAPU supra note 6 para 51.
35 Chirwa (SCA) supra note 8 para 10.
36 See in this regard Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 853
(SCA) paras 37–8.
37 Supra note 8 para 14.
38 Much was made of this in Transnet’s heads of argument ﬁled in the Constitu-
tional Court. Paragraphs 46–52 show quite convincingly that Transnet’s power to
dismiss Ms Chirwa springs from the contract between her and Transnet and not from
any overtly public source (respondent’s heads of arguments, available at http://
www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/9154.PDF, last accessed 19 April
2007). Further, Transnet argued that since the expiry of a period of two years from the
establishment of Transnet, its employees have in terms of theAct not been considered
‘state’ employees. Employees of Transnet are now to be considered on the same basis
as ordinary private-sector employees (s 9(2) read with s 9(3)). See also Industrial Coun-
cil for the Building Industry (Western Province) v Transnet Industrial Council 1999 (1) SA
505 (SCA) at 511B-H.
39 Chirwa (SCA) supra note 8 para 15.
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When Transnet dismissed Ms Chirwa it was acting, in Mthiyane JA’s view,
on the basis of contract in its capacity as an employer and not in terms of
legislation in its capacity as a public authority.40 Langa CJ agrees with this
view, holding that the dismissal took place in terms of the contract of
employment and not in terms of any legislation.41 The Chief Justice notes
later on that the contractual source of a power is not decisive of whether it is
public.42 What Langa CJ’s judgment makes clear is that where a decision is in
terms of legislation, it must be an exercise of public power if it is to be an
administrative action in terms of PAJA. Where a decision is taken in terms of
legislation, whether it is public is decisive. The Constitutional Court’s
approach in AAA Investments rejects the idea that a decision is not public
simply because the immediate source of the decision is contract, and
describes the circumstances under which public-sector decisions are to be
considered exercises of public power — their contractual basis notwith-
standing.
3. Contractual public power
The AAA Investments case concerned a challenge to the validity of rules
regulating the micro-lending industry. In terms of a ministerial exemption to
the now-repealed UsuryAct 73 of 1968,43 loans of less than a certain amount
were not subject to the usury and interest controls of the Act. The
micro-ﬁnance industry grew ‘exponentially’ in the wake of the exemption
but, in the absence of any signiﬁcant constraints on lenders, complaints of
abuse began to surface.44 Seeing the need for regulation, the Minister of
Trade and Industry issued a second exemption notice that required all micro
lenders to register with a regulatory institution approved by the Minister and
comply with the rules set by that institution.45 The Micro Finance
Regulatory Council (the Council) was formed and subsequently recognized
by the Minister as the regulatory body.46 It was thereby authorized to make
rules regulating the activities of money-lenders. The source of the power is
clearly public. It arises only from the terms of the legislation.47 But this
inquiry has only incidental value. The issue before the court, and the issue of
relevance here, was whether a private regulatory body with the power in
40 Ibid.
41 Chirwa (CC) supra note 10 para 185.
42 Ibid para 189.
43 The notice of exemption was issued by the Minister of Trade and Industry in
GN 3451 GG 14498 of 31December 1992.
44 AAA Investments supra note 15 para 10.
45 GN 713 GG 20145 of 1 June 1999. See also AAA Investments supra note 15 para
12.
46 GN 911 GG 20307 of 16 July 1999.
47 The ministerial notices form part of the Act by virtue of the deﬁnition of
‘national legislation’ in s 239 of the Constitution, which includes ‘subordinate legisla-
tion made in terms of an Act of Parliament’. See AAA Investments supra note 15 para
42.
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terms of legislation to make rules regulating an industry exercises public
power when it does so.
The judgment of the SCA in the AAA Investments case48 relied on the
nature of the relationship between the Micro Finance Regulatory Council
and those subject to its control to determine the nature of the power
exercised by the council. It held that since the council was a private regulator
exercising power only over those who participate, voluntarily, in the
micro-ﬁnance industry, none of its actions or decisions could be considered
‘public’:
‘The Council is not, and does not purport to be, a public regulator with
authority unilaterally to exercise powers over outside parties. It is a company
that conducts business as a private regulator of lenders who choose to submit to
its authority by agreement. In regulating micro-lenders who agree to such
regulation, it does not purport to be exercising legislative or other public
powers that require a constitutional or legislative source. It purports only to
regulate those who are willing to submit to its regime and the source of its
authority to do so is their consent.’49
On this view, the council’s rules operated only in the private sphere by
reason of the contractual relationship.50 The rules had no effect on the public
at large, but applied only to micro-lenders who had consented to being so
bound.51 This was enough to convince the SCA that the council did not
exercise public power when it made the rules, and did not need to comply
with the principles of the doctrine of legality in doing so.52
The Constitutional Court rejected this formalistic and categorical
approach. Recognizing that traditionally governmental functions are to an
increasing degree being outsourced to private entities, Yacoob J (writing for
the majority) referred with approval to the comment of the US Supreme
Court that government cannot ‘evade the most solemn obligations imposed
in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form’.53 The
important question whether a private body exercising a power traditionally
exercised by government should be subject to the same controls of legality as
48 Reported as Micro Finance Regulatory Council v AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd 2006
(1) SA27 (SCA).
49 Ibid para 24.
50 AAA Investments supra note 15 para 4.
51 Micro Finance Regulatory Council v AAA Investments supra note 48 para 26.
52 Courts have in the past relied on the existence of a contract to exclude the
principles of administrative law: see Mustapha v Receiver of Revenue, Lichtenburg 1958
(3) SA343 (A), Sibanyoni v University of Fort Hare 1985 (1) SA19 (Ck), Mkhize v Rector,
University of Zululand 1986 (1) SA 901 (D) and Naran v Head of the Department of Local
Government, Housing and Agriculture (House of Delegates) 1993 (1) SA 405 (T). All of
these cases and the formalism of their reasoning are discussed by Cora Hoexter ‘Con-
tracts in administrative law: Life after formalism?’ (2004) 121 SALJ 595.
53 Lebron v National Railroad Passenger Corporation 513 US 374 (1995) at 397,
referred to with approval by the court in AAA Investments supra note 15 para 33. See
also Hoexter op cit note 4 at 147–9 and 179, and Yvonne Burns ‘Government con-
tracts and the public/private law divide’ (1998) 13 SA Public Law 234.
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if government exercised that power itself cannot be made to rest entirely on
the fact that the private body concerned exercises power only over those
who, in terms of contracts, agree to be subject to that power. Yacoob J made
this quite clear where he outlined the terms of the inquiry before the court in
the case:
‘If the Council performs its functions in terms of national legislation, and these
functions are public in character, it is subject to the legality principle. . . . In our
constitutional structure, the Council or any other entity does not have to be
part of government or the government itself to be bound by the Constitution as
a whole. The way is now open to an investigation of the nature of the Council
and the nature of the function it performs.’54
I am not overly concerned here with the factors the court relied on to
establish the public nature of the council’s functions, or the factors that courts
before now have relied on.55 As Hoexter notes, ‘what gives a power its
‘‘public’’ character is a question that the courts are currently answering in an
incremental fashion’,56 and this article is not intended to examine the present
state of that process of incremental development. Rather, my point is that the
determination of whether a power or function is public or not depends on a
range of factors that is broader than simply whether the power or its extent is
set out in a contract. After weighing up all the relevant factors, Yacoob J
concluded that the functions of the council could not be considered private
despite the fact that the council was a private company:
‘The Council’s composition and mandate show that although its legal form is
that of a private company, its functions are essentially regulatory of an industry
. . . I strain to ﬁnd any characteristic of autonomy in the functions of the
Council equivalent to that of an enterprise of a private nature. The Council
regulates in the public interest and in the performance of a public duty. Its
decisions and Rules are subject to constitutional control.’57
It is clear from AAA Investments that powers exercised in terms of contract
can nevertheless be public. The contractual source or deﬁnition of a power
does not, on its own, exclude it from the realm of public decisions and the
controls the Constitution imposes on those decisions. It is not open to the
courts to refuse to apply administrative law only because the power is
exercised in terms of a contract or has its source in contract. On the contrary,
courts are obliged to examine the nature of power itself to determine if it is in
54 AAA Investments supra note 15 para 41 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
55 The jurisprudence in this regard is rich. See for example Dawnlaan Beleggings
(Edms) Bpk v Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1983 (3) SA 344 (W), Johannesburg Stock
Exchange v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd 1988 (3) SA 132 (AD) at 152E — I, and R v Panel
on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 All ER 564 (CA). The court’s
consideration of these factors and a discussion of approaches in comparable jurisdic-
tions are to be found in paras 31–8. For a review of the court’s conclusions see
Hoexter op cit note 4 at 181–3.
56 Op cit note 4 at 179.
57 Supra note 15 para 45.
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fact ‘public’. This obligation operates similarly in the context of public-
sector employment decisions.
4. The extension of administrative justice to state employees — the Zenzile
decision
The rejection of this categorical approach is only half the answer. Even
though contractual powers cannot be categorically shielded from the
controls of public law, it still has to be decided in every case whether a
decision in terms of a contract is of a public nature or not. AAA Investments is
no authority for the proposition that all exercises of contractual power by the
state, organs of state or even private regulatory bodies are public. Rather, the
case entrenches the principle that exercises of power in terms of contract can
in certain circumstances be public, and it must be determined on an
examination of the nature of the power itself, as well as a conspectus of other
relevant factors, whether each exercise of contractual power is public.
In this light, the Appellate Division’s decision in Administrator, Transvaal &
others v Zenzile & others,58 that the employment decisions of public
authorities do involve the exercise of public power, is important. The case
concerned a challenge to a decision to dismiss a handful of public servants for
misconduct. The respondents had been employed as cleaners and ward aids
at the Natalspruit Hospital, and participated in a two-day work stoppage in
support of a demand that a previously dismissed colleague be reinstated. The
question before the court was whether the decision to dismiss the
respondents was properly subject to the requirements of natural justice.
Sitting in 1991, long before the intellectual constraints of PAJA’s convoluted
deﬁnition of ‘administrative action’, the Appellate Division was able to
engage directly with the nature of the impugned decision. Hoexter JA,
writing for a unanimous court, made reference to the nature of the functions
of the public hospital at which the respondents were employed. Responding
to the appellants’ argument that the relationship between the parties was
simply one of master and servant and governed by the common law of
contract, Hoexter JA said:
‘I am unable to accept that argument. One is here concerned not with mere
employment under a contract of service between two private individuals, but
with a form of employment which invests the employee with a particular status
which the law will protect. Here the employer and decisionmaker is a public
authority whose decision to dismiss involved the exercise of a public power.
The element of public service injected by statute necessarily entails, so I
consider, that the respondents were entitled to the beneﬁt of the application of
the principles of natural justice before they could be summarily dismissed for
misconduct.’59
The Appellate Division’s approach here is consistent with the Constitu-
tional Court’s approach in AAA Investments and the jurisprudence on which
58 1991 (1) SA21 (A).
59 Ibid at 34B–D.
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the court relied. In Dawnlaan Beleggings, for example, the High Court relied
on the fact that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, although a private body
exercising power over its members in terms of contract, was required by the
legislation establishing it to carry on its business ‘with due regard to the
public interest’, to make rules to safeguard and further the public interest and
list securities only if that was in the public interest.60 And in R v Panel on
Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc61 the Court of Appeal held that the
panel was subject to the controls of administrative law because it performed
an important public function and its decisions indirectly affect the public.
This was so, the Court of Appeal held, notwithstanding the fact that the
panel was a private body not created in terms of any legislation whose sole
source of power was a ‘consensual submission to its jurisdiction’.62 The
Constitutional Court referred to both of these cases in support of its
conclusions in AAA Investments.63 In the POPCRU case Plasket J reﬁned this
approach by indicating that ‘the elusive concept of public power is not
limited to exercises of public power that impact on the public at large’.64
What makes the power ‘public’ is rather ‘the fact that it has been vested in a
public functionary who is required to exercise it in the public interest.’65
Plasket J therefore concluded that Zenzile was still good law and considered
himself bound by it.66
The AAA Investments case makes it clear that the denial of the principles of
administrative law to decisions taken in a contractual setting cannot be
justiﬁed merely on the basis that a contract is involved. The nature of the
decision itself must be engaged with, as must the nature and objects of the
institution exercising the power in terms of which the decision is taken. It is
hard to see how Zenzile is not determinative of the outcome in the Chirwa
case — but the outcome of Chirwa, on the particular facts and circumstances
of the case, is not really my focus here. Following this reasoning, Langa CJ
found on the facts that the decision did not amount to an exercise of public
power.67 My concern is rather the objection that Zenzile, although correct, is
no longer relevant, and that public-sector employment decisions, even
though properly considered exercises of a public power, should nevertheless
be exempted from the controls of administrative law.
60 Dawnlaan supra note 55 at 361F and 364C-D.
61 Supra note 55 at 577a–d.
62 Ibid at 577a-b.
63 Supra note 15 paras 31–2.
64 Supra note 5 para 53.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid para 64.
67 Langa CJ held that Ms Chirwa’s dismissal would have a very small impact on the
public since the department of Transnet in which she worked does not have the same
public character that the Department of Correctional Services does, for example.
WhenTransnet dismissedMs Chirwa it was not acting in the public interest but in the
best interests of the particular business unit of Transnet in which Ms Chirwa was
employed (supra note 10 paras 188, 192–3).
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III THE SEPARATION OF PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE LAW
1. Substituting labour law for administrative law
There are two steps in the argument dismissing the precedent of Zenzile. The
ﬁrst step is to claim that the decision can no longer be justiﬁed since its
‘doctrinal underpinnings’68 are out of place in the constitutional era. At the
time Zenzile was decided the Labour RelationsAct 28 of 1956 was in force.69
The 1956 Labour Relations Act speciﬁcally excluded state employees from
its ambit.70 State employees could not rely on the protections of labour law at
all, despite the fact that they found themselves in the same poor bargaining
position in relation to their employers as their private-sector counterparts. In
order to offer some protection against the state-as-employer, the courts
subjected the actions of the state-as-employer to the requirements of natural
justice. ‘Historically, recourse was had to administrative law in order to
protect employees who did not enjoy the protection that private sector
employees enjoyed.’71 Since 1995, however, public-sector and state employ-
ees have been included within the ambit of the LRA.72 The justiﬁcation and
the motivation for extending the protections of administrative law to state
employees has been undermined, Murphy AJ held in SAPU, by the
extension of the protections of labour law to those employees:
‘It follows from this line of thought that the progressive decisions of our courts,
extending labour rights to public sector employees by categorizing employer
conduct as administrative action, have lost their force following the codiﬁca-
tion of our administrative law and labour law, and the extension of full labour
rights to public sector employees by the LRA. Courts might therefore
justiﬁably be expected to reconsider previous doctrine in the light of the new
constitutional and statutory framework.’73
Conradie JA concluded for similar reasons in Chirwa that the answer to the
question whether dismissals in the public domain should be dealt with as
administrative acts must ‘since the advent of the LRA . . . be no’.74 Similarly,
68 SAPU supra note 6 para 67.
69 ThisAct was repealed in 1995 by s 212 read with Schedule 6 of the LRA.
70 Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act. Along with state employees, employees of local
authorities and persons who taught, educated or trained other persons at any univer-
sity, technikon, college, school or other educational institution maintained wholly or
partly from public funds were excluded from the application of the 1956 LRA.
71 Chirwa (CC) supra note 10 para 148 per Ngcobo J. See also Public Servants
Association obo Haschke supra note 7 para 11 and SAPU supra note 6 para 64, where
this idea is expressed in similar terms.
72 In terms of s 2 of the LRA only ‘soldiers and spies’ are excluded from the
application of the LRA. There have however been a number of decisions recently
considering the extent to which members of the South African National Defence
Force can rely on the constitutional right in s 23(5) to engage in collective bargaining
with their employer, the state. See, for example, SA National Defence Union v Minister
of Defence 2007 (5) SA400 (CC).
73 SAPU supra note 6 para 66.
74 Supra note 8 para 27.
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Ngcobo J held that it is no longer necessary to subject public-sector
employees to the protection of administrative law,75 while Skweyiya J
supported Conradie J’s conclusion in no uncertain terms.76
The second step in the argument is to draw an impenetrable line between
administrative law and labour law. Pillay J draws this line most starkly in the
Haschke case:
‘Labour law is not administrative law. They may share many common
characteristics. However, administrative law falls exclusively in the category of
public law, whereas labour law has elements of administrative law, procedural
law, private law and commercial law.’77
Given this ﬁssure between the ﬁelds of labour law and administrative law, the
two are mutually exclusive. The conclusion to which Murphy AJ was
‘instinctively drawn’ in SAPU was that administrative action does not
embrace acts properly regulated by private law.78 Where the LRA applies,
then, administrative law does not:
‘By extending the beneﬁts of the LRA to, and imposing its restrictions on,
employees of the state and its organs the legislature . . . took dismissals out of
the realm of administrative law.’79
On this view an act or decision to which the LRA applies — like a
dismissal — which meets all the requirements of ‘administrative action’ so
deﬁned and could therefore be expected to be subject to the controls of
administrative law and PAJA, will nevertheless be cloaked from scrutiny in
terms of administrative law by the LRA.
2. The Steenkamp decision
The majority of the Constitutional Court in the Steenkamp case followed a
line somewhat similar to this to the extent that its judgment preserves a
distinction between different ﬁelds of law. But what the Steenkamp decision
does not contemplate is the ousting of one set of legal principles by the mere
applicability of another.
The question before the court in Steenkamp was whether damages in delict
can be claimed as a remedy for a public-law wrong.80 The applicant in the
case, Steenkamp, acted in his capacity as the liquidator of a company called
Balraz. The company had won a tender to provide certain services to the
Eastern Cape provincial government, and had incurred expenses in
performing in terms of the tender contract. The tender award was, however,
75 Chirwa (CC) supra note 10 para 148.
76 Ibid paras 38–44.
77 Supra note 7 para 11.
78 Supra note 6 para 51.
79 Chirwa (SCA) supra note 8 para 29 per Conradie JA.
80 Supra note 16 para 1: ‘The narrow issue is whether ﬁnancial loss caused by
improper performance of a statutory or administrative function should attract liability
for damages in delict.’
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challenged before the Bisho High Court and set aside.81 Because it had been
placed in liquidation by the time of the judgment, Balraz was unable to
contest the second tender process. The company thus found itself out of
pocket for the money it had spent before the award of the tender contract
was set aside and without any means of recovering those costs.82 Steenkamp’s
argument was that the respondent (the Provincial Tender Board) had, in
making a reviewable decision, breached obligations imposed by administra-
tive law. He argued that the Provincial Tender Board owed Balraz a duty in
law to exercise its powers fairly and impartially, to take reasonable care in the
evaluation of tenders, and to ensure that the award of the tender was
reasonable in the circumstances.83 Steenkamp sought to advance the
argument that the breach of this administrative-law duty was wrongful for
the purposes of the law of delict and attracted liability for damages in delict.
The majority of the court disagreed with this argument. Its starting point
in doing so was the distinction between private law and public law.
Moseneke DCJ, writing for the majority, held as follows:
‘It goes without saying that every improper performance of an administrative
function would implicate the Constitution and entitle the aggrieved party to
appropriate relief. In each case the remedy must ﬁt the injury. . . . It is
nonetheless appropriate to note that ordinarily a breach of administrative
justice attracts public law remedies and not private law remedies. The purpose
of a public law remedy is to pre-empt or correct or reverse an improper
administrative function.’84
The judgment makes it clear that public-law remedies apply to public-law
wrongs, and similarly, that private-law remedies are available for private-law
wrongs. The majority disagreed with the contention that the breach of the
administrative-law duty constituted a wrongful act in delict and that the
Provincial Tender Board had therefore perpetrated a private-law wrong
against Balraz.85 The wrong suffered by Balraz could not be said to be a
private-law wrong, and the applicant was in actual fact seeking a private-law
remedy for a public-law wrong that, in light of the separation of public- and
private-law remedies, was not available to him.86
81 The judgment is reported as Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd v Eastern Cape
Province 1999 (1) SA324 (Ck).
82 Supra note 16 para 11.
83 Ibid para 27.
84 Ibid para 29 (footnote omitted).
85 Ibid paras 55–6.
86 Langa CJ and O’Regan J ﬁled a dissenting judgment in which Mokgoro J
concurred. Although they reach quite the opposite conclusion and hold that the
applicant should have been able to claim damages in delict (paras 92–94), they do so
within the conceptual framework proposed by Moseneke DCJ. They accept
Moseneke DCJ’s premise that private law remedies are not available for public-law
wrongs — but do not accept Moseneke DCJ’s categorical conclusion that breaches of
administrative justice will never amount to delictually wrongful acts. Rather, they
considered whether on the facts the wrong committed could be regarded as a private-
law wrong, and found that ‘although it will often be so that no delictual claim will lie
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If any act can be shown to be a public-law wrong, then public-law
remedies must be available to correct the consequences of that act. If a
public-sector employment decision is the exercise of a public power and
amounts to administrative action, then, on the strength of the reasoning in
Steenkamp, the remedies of public law and administrative justice must be
available to the subjects of those decisions. On the strength of AAA
Investments read with Zenzile, I argue that this class of decisions does indeed
fall within the scope of public law. Sachs J, however, reads Moseneke DCJ’s
majority judgment to mean something else. In his view, the applicability of
administrative law ousts the beneﬁts and protections of the law of delict. If
this is the correct reading of the law, and the ‘ousting’ of alternate branches of
law is acceptable, then Skweyiya J, Ngcobo J, Conradie JA and Murphy AJ
are justiﬁed in concluding that public-sector employees enjoy the protec-
tions of labour law alone. By engaging directly with this ‘law-ousting-law’
argument, however, I am able to show that its results are logically impossible.
IV THE IMPOSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF ‘LAW OUSTING LAW’
My reading of Moseneke DCJ’s judgment in Steenkamp is simply that a
public-law wrong will attract public-law remedies. Sachs J agrees with this
view to the extent that he sees the wrong suffered by Balraz as a public-law
wrong which must be remedied by the application of public-law principles.
But Sachs J goes further than Moseneke DCJ. He concludes that the
existence of a public-law remedy precludes any private-law remedies that
may have been available. He states the following in this regard:
‘Both the interim Constitution and the ﬁnal Constitution envisage a right to
just administrative action. The implication is that a constitutionalised form of
judicial review is intended to cover the ﬁeld, both in substantive and remedial
terms. To my mind it would not only be jurisprudentially inelegant and
functionally duplicatory to permit remedies under constitutionalised adminis-
trative law, and remedies under the common law, to function side by side. It
would be constitutionally impermissible. The provision in PAJA to the effect
that in special circumstances a court reviewing administrative action could
award compensation, did not invent the public law remedy it articulates. On
the contrary, it gave precise expression to a remedy already implicit in the
interim Constitution and, later, in the ﬁnal Constitution.
The existence of this constitutionally-based public law remedy renders it
unnecessary and inappropriate to hybridise and stretch the common-law delict
of injury beyond its traditional limits in this area. Just compensation today can
be achieved where necessary by means of PAJA.’87
It may seem at ﬁrst that this conclusion is at odds with the decisions of
against the Tender Board . . . there will be times when an action for damages will lie’
(para 89). Their conclusion was simply that Balraz had suffered a private-law wrong
in the form of delict, the wrongfulness element of which had been satisﬁed by the
breach of an administrative-law duty.
87 Ibid paras 99–100.
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MurphyAJ in SAPU and Skweyiya J, Ngcobo J, and Conradie JA in Chirwa:
while those judgments deny the application of administrative law, Sachs J
afﬁrms its application in very clear terms. However, the structure of the
reasoning underpinning each judgment is the same. All of the judgments rest
on premise that our law does not admit the possibility of two remedies in
two separate branches of law for a single act. The approach demands that
where a comprehensive set of remedies is available under one branch of law
for the correction or prevention of an actionable wrong, the principles of
that branch of law must be applied to give effect to those remedies. The
consequently categorical application of one branch of law precludes recourse
to remedies under any other branch of law. But there are a number of serious
problems with this approach, and with Justice Sachs as my interlocutor, I
turn now to these problems.
1. The duplication of remedies
The effect of the law-ousting-law approach in the public-sector employ-
ment arena is to deny the constitutional protections of rights to administra-
tive justice where they are nevertheless applicable. The suggestion that rights
enshrined in the Bill of Rights can be withheld from individuals because they
have other legal options available to them is a jarring one when viewed in
terms of the spirit and objects of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, it seems
wholly inconsistent with the principle that the Bill of Rights applies to all
law88 as well as the principle that law or conduct inconsistent with the
Constitution is invalid.89 As Plasket J says in POPCRU, this approach fails ‘to
give individuals the full measure of their fundamental rights’.90 He goes on to
note that there is ‘nothing incongruous’ about more than one fundamental
right applying to the same act.91 But even apart from concerns about
emaciating the Bill of Rights, our law has always accepted the overlap of
different ﬁelds of law.92 It is not unusual for the same set of facts to give rise to
more than one legal action, or even legal actions in different branches of law,
and for individuals to elect which action to pursue. Contractual and delictual
claims often overlap, and the validity of simultaneous actions lying to an
individual was recognized in Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost.93 In that case
theAppellate Division held that a negligent misstatement inducing a contract
gave rise not only to a claim in contract but also, if that misstatement caused
loss, to a claim in delict.94 In Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt the SCA held
that the protections of the LRA supplemented employees’ common-law
88 Section 8(1) of the Constitution.
89 Section 2 of the Constitution.
90 Supra note 5 para 60.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid para 61.
93 1991 (4) SA559 (A).
94 Ibid at 568F-569E.
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rights against unfair dismissal.95 Rights in terms of a contract of employment
do not disappear simply because the LRA affords additional rights:
‘[T]here can be no suggestion that the constitutional dispensation deprived
employees of the common-law right to enforce the terms of a ﬁxed-term
contract of employment.’96
Further, it is clear from the scheme of other labour legislation like the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 that the legislation offers a
minimum of protection that can be supplemented by contractual terms or
other laws. Section 4 of the Basic Conditions of EmploymentAct states that a
‘basic condition’ provided in the Act constitutes a term of any contract of
employment unless any other law or the terms of the contract of
employment itself are more favourable to the employee.97 The codiﬁcation
of labour rights in legislation and the establishment of what purports to be a
comprehensive system of labour law does not diminish or undermine rights
and remedies located outside the provisions of that legislation.
Where the law recognizes that private-law remedies coexist, and that the
establishment of new private-law remedies does not deprive individuals of
private-law remedies they enjoyed previously, it can hardly be suggested that
the existence of a framework of private-law remedies deprives individuals of
the protections afforded to them by the public-law rights embedded in the
Bill of Rights. Langa CJ argues that litigants are entitled to the protection of
all applicable rights, even where they cover the same ground, and agrees with
Cameron JA that where the legislature intends to prefer one right over others
it must say so in explicit and unambiguous terms.98
To this Justice Sachs might reply that the Constitutional Court has already
rejected the side-by-side operation of remedies under the common law and
under the Constitution. Early in our constitutional jurisprudence the SCA
tried to maintain a distinction between systems of law in the Container
Logistics case, holding that ‘judicial review under the Constitution and under
the common law are different concepts’;99 but in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
the Constitutional Court stated forcefully that there is only one system of
law, and that all law derives its force from, and is shaped by, the
Constitution.100 The court has since held that it is not open to litigants to rely
95 2002 (1) SA49 (SCA) para 13 perNugentAJA.
96 Ibid para 15. See also Stadsraad van Pretoria v Van Wyk 1973 (2) SA 779 (A) at
784D-H, where it was stated that a statute will be interpreted to deprive individuals of
existing remedies only if that is expressly stated or necessarily implied in the statute,
and United National Public Servants Association of South Africa v Digomo NO (2005) 26
ILJ 1957 (SCA) para 4.
97 See Marylyn Christianson, Carl Mischke & E M L Strydom (eds) Essential
Labour Law 3 ed (2002) 331–2.
98 Chirwa (CC) supra note 10 para 175.
99 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Container Logistics (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner of
Customs and Excise v Rennies Group Ltd t/a Renfreight 1999 (3) SA771 (SCA) para 20.
100 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic
of South Africa 2000 (2) SA674 (CC) para 44.
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separately on the provisions of legislation on one hand and on the common
law and the Constitution on the other, since this would lead to the
development of ‘parallel streams’ of jurisprudence.101 Justice Sachs might
argue on this basis that the ousting of certain sets of legal provisions is
consistent with the court’s approach and the scheme of our Constitution.
This objection is mirrored in, and perhaps explains, a resistance to ‘forum
shopping’.102 The extension of administrative as well as labour-law remedies
to public-sector employees allows them to choose whether to pursue claims
in the High Court or in the Labour Court, and will allow the development
of parallel streams of jurisprudence in these separate fora. The situation is
further complicated by the fact that the remedies of the LRA and PAJA are
signiﬁcantly different,103 and public-sector employees can claim protections
that their counterparts in the private sector cannot claim.104
What these arguments fail to recognize, though, is that drawing away from
the development of parallel streams of jurisprudence is motivated by a need
to preserve conceptual integrity within a single branch of law — and within a
single forum. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers approach denies the concur-
rent availability of common-law and constitutional remedies for administra-
tive wrongs, and by extension denies the concurrent availability of
common-law and constitutional remedies for labour wrongs. But the
approach certainly does not go so far as to deny the concurrent availability of
administrative-law remedies and contract-law remedies, for example. The
approach is premised on the fact that the protections of administrative justice
and fair labour practices derive from the Constitution, and that accessing
those protections proceeds according to the scheme envisaged by the
Constitution. Rights in contract or in delict are not within the constitutional
scheme of either fair labour practices or administrative justice, however, and
allowing these rights to operate alongside administrative or labour rights does
not raise the danger of parallel streams of jurisprudence within a single set of
legal principles. Similarly, the development of labour-law jurisprudence in
the Labour Court and administrative-law jurisprudence in the High Court
does not represent the development of parallel streams of jurisprudence in
regard to a single set of legal principles. There is no constitutional reason to
ﬂee the phantom of forum-shopping.
101 See New Clicks supra note 3 paras 431–6 (Ngcobo J) and the authority referred
to there.
102 Van Eck & Jordaan-Parkin ‘Administrative, labour and constitutional law — A
jurisdictional labyrinth’op cit note 4 at 1990. Ngcobo J also refers to forum-shopping
and ‘all its unfortunate consequences’ in his judgment in Chirwa CC supra note 10
para 121.
103 Skweyiya J argues that the ‘purpose-built’ remedies of labour law should take
precedence over ‘non-purpose-built processes and forums in situations involving
employment-related matters’ (Chirwa (CC) supra note 10 para 41). See also Van Eck
& Jordaan-Parkin op cit note 4 at 1995 and Pillay ‘PAJA v labour law’ op cit note 4 at
421.
104 Van Eck& Jordaan-Parkin op cit note 4 at 1990.
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To the extent that a choice between legal protections and forums is open
to public-sector employees and not private employees, this inequality ﬂows
from the constitutional framework itself. It cannot be remedied by creative
interpretation of the Constitution, PAJA or the LRA without undermining
the principles of the constitutional protections of administrative justice and
fair labour practices. The inequality can only be remedied by the legislature
— a point that Langa CJ makes.105
2. Selecting the applicable branch of law
Sachs J’s approach presupposes an ordering of legal remedies that is not
apparent from the principles on which he relies. Without an ordering of
remedies it is impossible to know which set of remedies is to take precedence
and which, in light of the primacy of the other, is to be ousted.
Justice Sachs’s answer would perhaps turn on a consideration of the
intention of the legislature. He says in Steenkamp that the constitutionalized
administrative-law system is intended to ‘cover the ﬁeld’.106 For this reason
the constitutionalized system of administrative law excludes the remedies of
other branches of law whenever they run into each other. In New Clicks the
‘cover the ﬁeld’ argument was used to assert that one cannot sidestep the
requirements of PAJA by relying directly on s 33 of the Constitution.107
PAJA is required by s 33(3) of the Constitution to cover the ﬁeld and it
purports to do so. There is no basis in law for accessing administrative-justice
rights except through the provisions of PAJA. However, this response suffers
from the same defect as the response in the previous section. PAJA and the
constitutionalized system of review are intended to cover the ﬁeld of
administrative law. It is not the intention of s 33, nor could it have been the
intention of the legislature when it drafted PAJA, that the system of
administrative law should cover a ﬁeld of law other than administrative law.
The answer that the system of law that ‘covers the ﬁeld’ is the system that will
take precedence over other remedies does not advance Justice Sachs’s cause,
because the covering of ‘a ﬁeld’ does not affect the validity or availability of
legal remedies in another ﬁeld. This response does not supply a reason for
why the subjects of decisions should not be able to seek, at their election,
remedies that are appropriate to the wrong perpetrated against them.
3. The impossible outcome
Something of an ordering of legal remedies could perhaps be gleaned from
the principle of avoidance, which suggests that the Constitution is to be
relied upon directly only as a last resort.108 Again, this approach is useful only
105 Chirwa (CC) supra note 10 para 177. See also Van Eck & Jordaan-Parkin op cit
note 4 at 1998 and Plasket J in POPCRU supra note 5 para 59.
106 Steenkamp supra note 16 para 99.
107 Supra note 3 para 95 per Chaskalson CJ.
108 S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) para 59, Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei 1995
(4) SA 615 (CC) paras 2–5, Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Land Affairs 1997
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where constitutional and non-constitutional remedies exist within a single
branch of law, and does not offer a solution where the available remedies are
located in different branches of law. Apart from the fact that Sachs J’s
approach is in stark contrast to the principle of avoidance, in prioritizing the
constitutional remedy over the common-law remedy, a more fundamental
problem is that his approach makes no room for the operation of the
principle where remedies based on two constitutional rights are available.
On Justice Sachs’s approach, where labour law and administrative law
apply to the same factual scenario, the outcome is absurd. The application of
either system of law makes the application of the other impossible — but if
both systems of law do apply, then each system ousts the other. Public-sector
employment decisions are thus governed by both administrative law and
labour law, and by neither administrative law nor labour law. If Sachs J is
correct that it is constitutionally impermissible for remedies to be duplicated,
and that where administrative law applies it ousts the application of other
branches of law because it covers the ﬁeld, then it must be the case that
where labour law applies, which also purports to cover the ﬁeld, it ousts the
application of all other branches of law.109 The logic that leads to Sachs J’s
conclusion in Steenkamp is the same in form and structure as the logic that
leads to the conclusions of Skweyiya J, Ngcobo J and Conradie JA in Chirwa
and Murphy AJ in SAPU: if either of the arguments is sound, then so is the
other. But if either argument is sound, then the other cannot be. When the
arguments run into each other, as in Chirwa where administrative law and
labour law are both relevant, the absurdity of this approach is patent.
Judge Sachs might argue, as the majority of the Constitutional Court in
Chirwa does,110 that in drafting s 210 of the LRA the legislature intended the
LRA to take precedence in the case of conﬂict over the provisions of any
other Act of Parliament.111 The problem is that if Sachs J’s Steenkamp
argument is to be accepted, then even s 210 would be ousted by
(2) SA621 (CC) para 18. See also Iain Currie ‘Judicious avoidance’ (1999) 15 SAJHR
138 and Theunis Roux ‘Turning a deaf ear: The right to be heard by the Constitu-
tional Court: Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Land Affairs 1996 (12) BCLR
(CC)’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 216.
109 Section 1 of the LRAmakes it quite clear that the Act is intended to give effect
to and regulate the rights protected in s 23 of the Constitution, in exactly the same
way that PAJA gives ﬂesh to the rights in s 33(1) and (2). The Constitutional Court
has recognized the similarity between the Acts for this reason, stating that, because
they are both pieces of legislation regulating rights conferred in the Bill of Rights,
legal questions about the interpretation of theActs will always be constitutional issues
(see National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003
(3) SA 1 (CC) para 14 and Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 (5) SA 460
(CC) para 23).
110 Chirwa (CC) supra note 10 paras 49–50.
111 Section 210 of the LRAreads:
‘If any conﬂict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises between this Act
and the provisions of any other law save the Constitution or any Act expressly
amending this Act, the provisions of this Act will prevail.’
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administrative law and the application of PAJA. The body of labour law and
all its protections, on Sachs J’s view, are not permitted to function side by side
with the protections of administrative law. If the arguments of Sachs J on one
hand and Skweyiya J, Ngcobo J, Conradie JA and Murphy AJ on the other
are accepted, the outcome is impossible. The two arguments are mutually
destructive, and cannot operate within the same legal system. The simple
solution would be to throw out the conclusions of just one of the arguments,
leaving the conclusions of the other argument intact: restore the possibility of
a ﬁne sunny day by Tipp-Exing over ‘the middle of the night’ part of the
rhyme. Rejecting one of these arguments, however, necessarily entails the
rejection of the other, because the structure and form of the arguments are
identical. It is not that the conclusion of one argument is incompatible with
the other, but that the logic that supports both conclusions itself leads to the
impossible situation. The impossible situation is inherent in the argument,
and the argument, for this reason, cannot correctly form part of our law.
To put the situation to which this reasoning leads in less austere legal
terms, Sachs J and Skweyiya J (or Ngcobo J, Conradie JA or Murphy AJ) are
facing each other back to back, at midnight on a ﬁne day, and shooting each
other with their swords.
V CONCLUSION
Labour legislation is premised on the idea that those seeking employment are
in a weaker bargaining position than those giving employment. Contracts of
employment or the terms on which employment is taken are therefore likely
to be dictated by employers rather than employees.112 The framework of
labour legislation, and indeed the constitutional right to fair labour practices,
is intended to reduce the disparity in bargaining power, and offer employees
legal protections they would most probably otherwise not enjoy. The SCA
has suggested that one of the considerations in deciding whether a
contractual power is public is whether the subject of the power was in a
substantially weaker bargaining position when the contract was entered
into.113 Since those to whom labour legislation applies are in a weaker
bargaining position than their employers, it seems axiomatic that powers of
employment, when exercised by the state or organs of state, are public
See Public Servants Association obo Haschke supra note 7 para 15 and Pillay ‘PAJA v
labour law’op cit note 4 for argument s on this point. The argument must in any case
bear the criticism that it undermines other fundamental rights. It is easy to proffer an
alternative interpretation of s 210 that, whatever the intention of the legislature was
in including it, it was not to diminish or strip the Bill of Rights of its content.
112 See Christianson et al op cit note 97 at 11–12.
113 Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO supra note 29 para 10 and Cape Metropolitan
Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC 2001 (3) SA 1013 (SCA) para 18.
See also the High Court judgment in the AAA Investments matter: AAA Investments
(Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council 2004 (6) SA 557 (T), where the court
emphasized that micro-lenders had no option but to comply with the council’s rules
(at 564H-565B).
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powers. An obvious retort here could be that since state employees have the
protections of labour law they are no longer in a weaker bargaining position.
But this response begs the question why labour law should be able to
pre-empt the application of administrative law in the ﬁrst place. I have
argued that there is no categorical reason to deny the protections of
administrative law to public-sector employees. Langa CJ supports this view,
saying that his conclusion on the facts does not mean that dismissals of
public-sector employees will never constitute administrative action in terms
of PAJA.114 The question whether a public-sector employment decision is
public for the purposes of judicial review depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case; and a meaningful investigation of the nature of
the power or function and the purpose of the institution exercising it is
required. The justiﬁcations that have been given for the categorical approach
to the application of labour law or administrative law cannot be accepted.
First, the arguments in support of those justiﬁcations are ﬂawed, and
secondly, the ultimate conclusions of the approach are absurd.
It is telling that the majority decision in Chirwa has been uncomfortably
received in the lower courts. In Nakin v The MEC, Department of Education,
Eastern Cape Province and another115 Froneman J openly criticised the
law-ousting-law thesis on the strenth of which the majority withheld the
protections of administrative law, and preferred reasoning identical to that of
Plasket J in POPCRU.116 The absurdity of the majority’s decision will
continue to stymie lower courts and perpetuate confusion until the
impossible situation that the majority decion decision has created is
acknowledge and corrected.
114 Chirwa (CC) supra note 10 para 194.
115 [2008] 2All SA559 (Ck).
116 Supra notes 90 and 91.
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